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IN THE SUPREME COUBT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
It CEOHGE llRADBCRY, Admin-
istrator of the Estate of GEORGE 
H. BHA.DBlrltY, Deceased, and 
ALTHEA llR.ADBURY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
GORDO~ L. RASMUSSEN and 
Y'OlL\ GENE RASMUSSEN, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
10055 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ST .. c\.TE:\IENT OF FACTS 
The Staten1ent of Facts contained in the Brief of 
Appellants is substantially accurate as far as it goes, 
although it tends to highlight the theory of Appellants. 
Also, two Findings of Facts are inserted out of context 
which again tends to emphasize the position of the Ap-
pellants. 
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Briefly the facts are as follows: 
1. The decedent, George R. Bradbury, at the time 
of the negotiations was an elderly man in excess of 83 
years, with failing eyesight and other disabilities inci-
dent to age. Although his deposition was taken and 
became part of the evidence in the case he became de-
ceased prior to the trial. Mrs. Bradbury was in excess 
of 73 years of age at all times material to the litigation. 
2. The discussions, prior to the preparation and 
signing of the documents sought to be cancelled in this 
action, were always in light of a sale and purchase at the 
price of $300.00 per acre for the property. 
3. All the terms of the transaction with reference 
to the leasing of the farm and paying half the proceeds, 
etc., were consistent with the understanding of the par-
ties; the only difference being what the Respondents 
thought the documents they had signed was for a Con-
tract of Sale rather than a Deed reserving a Life Estate. 
4. The Court found that the deed, lease and trans-
fer of the water stock was null and void and should be 
rescinded for the following reasons: 
(a) A confidential relationship existed between 
the parties thereto. 
(b) The plaintiff, Althea Bradbury, and her 
husband, George R. Bradbury, deceased, were elderly 
people, with infirmities incident to age. 
(c) The Defendants represented the transac· 
tion as being one for the sale of the farm and water 
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stock, when, in fact, the documents purported to make 
a gift of said property. 
(d) The transferors at no time intended to make 
a gift of such property. 
(e) The alleged transfer of the above mentioned 
property was made subject to a mistake of fact on the 
part of Plaintiffs as to the nature of the transaction and 
the transfers involved. 
(f) The Plaintiffs were of the opinion and under-
standing that said transactions were for the purpose 
of consummating the negotiations for the sale of the 
property. 
(g) That the transferors did not have the bene-
fit of independent advice in connection with said trans-
action. 
(h) By virtue of the alleged transfers of the 
property mentioned above, the transferors had substan-
tially disinherited their natural born heir, being their 
only son, R. George Bradbury. 
(i) The Defendants failed to prove by clear 
and conYincing evidence that the alleged gifts were fair, 
equitable~ Yalid and free from any fraud or undue in-
fluence arising from the faith and trust reposed in them 
because of the confidential relationship. ( 52-3). 
5. The Court stated that the primary issue for de-
termination was whether the Respondents intended a 
sale or gift of the property. The Respondents testified 
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that they did not understand the true nature of the 
transaction as represented by the documents signed by 
them, but rather they thought they were signing con-
tracts for the sale of the property to be paid out of 
one-half of the proceeds realized from the operation 
of the farm. They did not find out the true nature of 
the transaction until after a bank appraiser came to the 
home for the purpose of examining property reported 
to him to be owned by the Appellants. 
The argument of the points raised by the Appel-
lants will require further consideration of the evidence 
which will show that Mrs. Rasmussen knew she would 
not by law receive any inheritance; that she had been 
told by the natural heir that if she were left anything 
he would fight to take it away; that to implement a pre-
disposition to acquire the farm Mr. Rasmussen quit his 
job more than one year prior to the transaction for the 
admitted purpose that it would be easier to quit a job 
to take over the farm than to terminate a business; that 
in the meeting with Mr. Olson the Appellants were the 
dominant parties indicating the type of terms which 
would be acceptable to them but never mentioning that 
the prior discussions had always been in the form of a 
negotiated sale; that after the transaction the Appel-
lants were apprehensive of sustaining their position and 
scrupulously attempted to fortify the same by issuing 
a One Dollar check marked "Paid in Full"; that the 
Appellants had the stock certificates transferred with· 
out requesting the execution of the certificates them· 
selves and the new certificates were issued in the names 
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ot' the .\ ppellants without any reservation of the life 
estate. Further devclop1nent of these facts and other 
rdntcd facts. which 1nore than amply sustain the deci-
sion of the Trial Court, will be Inade in the argument 
hereinafter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TilE COCHT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT TI-IERE \V.AS 1\. CONFIDENTIAL RE-
L.\TIONSI-IIP EXISTING BETWEEN THE 
P.\HTIES AND THEREFORE THE RE-
SPOXDEX'l'S 1-I.AD THE BURDEN OF PROV-
1~(; TilE FAIRNESS OF THE TRANSAC-
TION. 
POINT II 
TI-IE COCHT PROPERLY CONCLUDED 
THAT AS A RESULT OF THE CONFIDEN-
TIAL HEL.A TIONSHIP THE APPELLANTS 
EXEHTED LrNDCE INFLUENCE UP 0 N 
THE RESPONDENTS. 
POINT III 
THE ~IOVIXG TO THE FARM BY THE 
APPELL.A.NTS :\IAY HA, ... E BEEN AN IN-
DrCE:\IENT FOR THE REDUCTION OF 
THE SALES PRICE BUT IT WAS NOT THE 
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CONSIDERATION F 0 R THE TRANSAC-
TION. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED 
TO A JURY TRIAL. 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT THERE WAS A CONFIDENTIAL RE-
LATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES AND THEREFORE THE RE-
SPONDENTS HAD THE BURDEN OF PROV-
ING THE FAIRNESS OF THE TRANSAC-
TION. 
The Appellants in their Brief on Page 10, after 
referring to the determination that there was a "confi-
dential relationship", stated: 
"However, the only evidence to sustain this 
determination was the fact that the Bradburys 
treated Y'Ora Rasmussen as their daughter and 
she loved and respected them as her parents." 
This statement is grossly inaccurate. In fact, it 
is surprising that the contention is now made at all 
since in the depositions and in the trial this point was 
practically conceded by the Appellants. The evidence 
in addition to the fact that the Respondents treated 
Y'Ora Rasmussen as their daughter comes from admis-
sions by counsel for the Appellants as well as state-
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ments from the 1\ ppellan ts themselves. Gordon Ras-
mussen, on two separate occasions in his deposition 
udmitted that a relationship of confidence and trust 
existed between the parties hereto. He stated: 
Q. Do you think they had a confidence and trust 
in you1 
.A. I an1 sure they did. (Deposition, Page 7). 
Q. \Vould you say at this time that you still had 
a good close relationship with your in-laws? 
A. \T ery good. 
Q. \Vould you say at this time that they had no 
reason to doubt you in any way; they placed 
confidence upon you and your wife? 
A. I say that they don't to this day have reason 
to haYe any doubt about us, other than just a 
family feud that has been bro~ght up by 
n1eans that has been previously talked of. 
Q. At any rate, the answer to my question, then, 
is that you did have a good, close relationship 
and that they would rely on what you say and 
accept your word for any transaction? 
A. They have no reason not to. 
Q. Just answer my question directly . 
. A. Yes. (Deposition, page 21) . 
\Vhen this issue first came up during the trial, Mr. 
Xielsen, counsel for the Appellants, stated: 
"There is no dispute about the fact that there 
was a confidential relationship." (R. 78). 
Thereafter counsel attempted to equivocate lrom 
the position taken. X evertheless there is more than ade-
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quate evidence affirming the court's determination that 
such a relationship existed and there is no evidence in 
the record attempting to rebut such proof. 
At the trial Gordon Rasmussen was called by the 
Respondents for the specific purpose of testifying con-
cerning such matter. He testified that the Respondents 
reposed trust and confidence in him and his wife at 
the time of the negotiations and signing of the deed, 
one month later when the check for one dollar was 
issued, and approximately one year later, which would 
cover the time that the water stock certificates were re-
issued. His testimony was as follows: 
A. Now do I understand the question-Do I 
feel that the Bradburys had trust and confi-
dence in me? 
Q. Right. 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Did the same situation exist, say one month 
after the papers were signed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you say that the situation existed ap-
proximately one year after the papers were 
signed, or more specifically at or near the 
time that the water certificates were trans-
ferred? 
A. Yes. (R. 190). 
Mrs. Bradbury testified concerning this issue as 
follows: 
10 
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Q. Did you at all ti1nes treat Y'Ora as if she was 
your natural born daughter 1 
A. I sure did. 
(~. Did you have a close relationship with her? 
.A. \\'ell, just like a mother would. I did every-
thing for her. 
(~. Did you have a lot of respect and confidence 
in her, and in her husband both? 
A. Yes. 
(~. I am talking about up to the time when we 
had this present difficulty, but up until that 
tin1e, did you repose trust and confidence in 
the defendants? 
A. l sure did. I trusted them. 
Q. Did ~ir. Bradbury have the same feelings 
toward them? 
A. Yes, he trusted them. (R. 7 4). 
There is no evidence in the record even attempting 
to refute the foregoing testimony. In view of the fore-
going it is difficult to comprehend on what basis the 
statement is nmde in Appellant's Brief that "the only 
eYidence to sustain this determination was the fact that 
the Bradburys treated Y'Ora Rasmussen as their 
daughter and she loved and respected them as her par-
ents." The balance of the argument submitted by thf 
Appellants after such statement consists of quotations 
from cases to the effect that the mere relationship of 
parent and child does not in and of itself create a pre-
sumption of a confidential relationship. Such cases are 
11 
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completely inapplicable since the evidence reviewed 
above shows that there was affirmative evidence show-
ing something more than the relationship of parent and 
child to substantiate the determination made by the 
Court. In fact the record would sustain a decision that 
there had been a stipulation by counsel for the Appel-
lants that a confidential relationship did exist. 
The Trial Court expressed no doubt concerning this 
issue. In its memorandu1n decision the following state-
ments were made: 
... the evidence is clear that during these ne-
gotiations between the parties there was a close 
confidential relationship. (R. 31). 
The defendants in this cause had a close and 
confidential relationship with plaintiffs * * * . 
(R. 33). 
In view of the record there is more than adequate 
substantial evidence to support the court's determina-
tion. The cases cited by the Appellants are not applic-
able. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED 
THAT AS A RESULT OF THE CONFIDEN-
TIAL RELATIONSHIP THE APPELLANTS 
EXERTED UNDUE INFLUENCE UPON 
THE RESPONDENTS. 
The Appellants in their contention under this point 
assume that the Trial Court was required to find specific 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ads and conduct constituting undue influence. Such is 
not the law. Rather, the Courts have held that where 
u confidential relationship exists the burden shifts to 
the donee to show the absolute fairness and validity of 
the gift and that it is free from the taint of undue in-
fluence. It' the donee fails to sustain that burden of 
proof the court is authorized to find that the gift is 
void, "through undue influence, without proof of speci-
fic nets and conduct of the donee." In 24 American 
Jurisprudence, Gifts, Sec. 49, P. 756, 757, it is stated: 
* * * It has also been held that if, at the time 
of' a gift, the donor's mind was enfeebled by age 
and disease, even though not to the extent of pro-
ducing mental unsoundness, and the donor acted 
without independent advice, such gift being of a 
large portion of all of the donor's estate and op-
erating substantially to deprive those having the 
natural claim to the donor's bounty of all benefit 
from the donor's estate, these circumstances, if 
proved and unexplained, will authorize a finding 
that the gift is void, through undue influence, 
!cithout proof of specific acts and conduct of the 
donee . . . (Emphasis added). 
Again in :24 An1erican Juris prudence, Gifts, Sec. 
116, page 791, it is stated: 
It has been held that where a confidential rela-
tionship exists between the donor and the donee 
at the time of the gift, it is generally considered 
~o be presun1ptively void, and the burden of proof 
Is on the donee to show the absolute fairness and 
Yilidity of the gift, and that it is free from the 
taint of undue influence. This rule is the same 
at law as in equity. * * * 
13 
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Moreover, where there is a fiduciary relation-
ship or a relationship of trust and confidence 
between a parent and child, then a presumption 
arises against the gift. 
In an annotation in 63 A.L.R. 2d 294, Sec. 13 en-
titled Evidence: Burden of Proof; Presumptions, it is 
stated: 
"It is generally agreed that to establish a gift 
of a debt to the debtor, the burden of proof rests 
upon the party alleging the fact, and that the 
evidence for such purpose must be clear and 
convincing. This requirement is especially ap-
plicable where the claim is not asserted until 
after the death of the creditor. There is no pre-
sumption, however, in such case that testimony 
of the debtor tending to show a gift is false. 
"Where it appears that a confidential relation-
ship existed between the parties, the debtor oc-
cupying the dominant or more influential posi-
tion, the court will scrutinize the evidence with 
great care. It has even been held that in such 
case a gift of the debt will be presumed, prima 
facie, to have been obtained by constructive fraud 
on the part of the debtor." (P. 294). 
The Utah cases are consistent with the foregoing 
general statements of the law. In Petersen vs. Budge, 
102 P. 211, 35 Utah 596 (1909), the Court recognized 
these well established rules involving gifts to persons 
in fiduciary relationships. It stated as follows: 
"There is no rule of law more firmly established 
than that which holds that transactions between 
persons occupying fiduciary o1· confidential rela-
tions with each other, in which the stronger or 
14 
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superior party obtained an advantage over the 
other, cannot be upheld. * * * 
"And the rule is well settled that in actions of 
this kind, where these confidential relations are 
known to exist, the burden of proof is cast upon 
the superior party to establish the perfect fair-
ness, adequacy of consideration, and equity of 
the transaction." 
In Smith, Law of Fraud, Sec. 190, the author says: 
"The law is jealous, and public policy sanc-
tions that transactions between persons occupy-
ing these relations shall receive the most careful 
sc1·utiny, and the burden of proof is shifted so 
as to require the beneficiary to establish the valid-
ity of bequests, gifts or grant." 
In the case of Jones vs. Cook, 223 P2d 423, 118 
Utah 562 ( 1950), the Court stated: 
"There is no presumption in favor of a gift 
inter Yivos. One who asserts title by gift inter 
,·ivos has the burden of proving that a gift was 
made, including the existence of all of the ele-
ments essential to its validity. 23 Am. J ur. P 
790; Spencer vs. Barlow, 319 Mo. 835, 5 S.W. 
2d 28. The rule is that "a clear and unmistakable 
intention on the part of a donor to make a gift 
of his property is an essential requisite of a gift 
inter Yivos." 38.C.J.S. Gifts, Sec. 15 P 790. This 
court held in Christensen v. Ogden State Bank 
75 lTtah 478, 286 P 638, and Holman v. Deseret 
Savings Bank, et al., 42 Utah 340, 124 P 765, 
that proof that decedent intended title to pass 
to the claimant during the lifetime of decedent, 
must be clear and convincing. In Raleigh v. 
\\ .. ells, 29 Lrtah, 217, 81 P. 908, 910, this court 
15 
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also declared that "Courts watch gifts, inter 
vivos with caution, especially where, as here, their 
enforcement would result in an inequitable dis-
tribution of the decedent's property." (223 P 
2d 423, 425, 426) . 
In Jardine vs. Archibald, 279 P 2d 454, 3 Utah 
2d 88 ( 1955) , the court again discussed the rules of 
law applicable to cases of this nature. In so doing it 
stated as follows: 
"However, since the court found as a fact that 
a confidential relationship existed between the 
decedent and the donees, and since the evidence 
clearly sustained such finding, the question of 
whether such donees had sustained their burden 
of proving lack of fraud or undue influence is 
more difficult of solution. 
" It is well settled that where a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship exists between the donor 
and donee, equity raises a presumption against 
the validity of such transactions and the burden 
is cast upon the donee to prove their validity and 
that there was no fraud or undue influence by 
proving affirmatively and by clear and convinc-
ing evidence compliance with equitable requi-
sites. This is so because there is implied in every 
fiduciary or confidential relationship a superior-
ity held by one of the parties over the other. See 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed. Vol. 
3 Sec. 956, Page 790, 279 P 2d,. 454, ~56.*** 
"Of course, among the elements which might 
be of great importance, in most cases in deter-
mining alleged undue influence where a confi-
dential relationship exists, is whether independ-
ent advice had been received by the donor and 
16 
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in some instances without such proof the donee 
n1ight not be able to sustain hi~ burde!l of prov-
ing good faith. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 
5th Ed. Sec. 956 Pages 796-98, states the rule 
thus: * * * 
The Supreme Court recognized and stated that in 
the cases of' this nature the presumption of undue influ-
ence inferred fron1 the relationship must be disproven 
hy "clear and convincing evidence." In so doing the 
court quoted frmn an earlier case as follows: 
"In Greener vs. Greener 116 Utah 571, 212 
P2d 195, in pages 204, 205, this court speaking 
through ~lr. Justice Wolfe in defining what 
quandum of proof is needed to be clear and con-
Yincing, said: 
" * * * That proof is convincing which car-
ries with it, not only the power to Eersuade the 
mind as to the probable truth or- correctness 
of the fact it proports to prove, but has the 
eleinent of clinching such truth or correctness. 
Clear and convincing proof clinches what 
might be otherwise probable to the mind.*** 
"But for a Inatter to be clear and convincing 
to a particular mind it must at least have 
reached the point where there remains no seri-
ousness or substantial doubt as to the correct-
ness of the conclusion. * * * " 
Fron1 the foregoing authorities it seems abundantly 
clear that the burden is not on the Respondents in this 
case to show specific acts of undue influence but rather, 
once the confidential relationship has been established 
the burden shifts to the Appellants to prove by clear 
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and convincing evidence the perfect fairness, adequacy 
of consideration,and equity of the transaction. 
The Court, in this case, however, did not just rely 
upon the failure of the Appellants to sustain the burden 
of proof that the transaction was fair and equitable. 
Rather, the Court, in its Memorendum Decision seemed 
impressed with the fact the Appellant had, in fact, exer-
cised undue influence. The Court stated: 
"The proof, gathered from n1any sources, 
leaves the Chancellor with the fixed feeling that 
the Defendants were determined that this prop-
erty must and would be placed beyond the reach 
of R. G. Bradbury, the only heir of Plaintiffs. 
There is an unending thread running throughout 
the offered proof that a sale of $300.00 per acre 
was discussed from tQ.e beginning of these nego-
tiations until the eruption between the parties. 
*** 
''The testimony, and the partial dependence of 
Defendants' cause is predicated on the feeling 
that Defendants were determined that the end 
result of their negotiations with Plaintiffs would 
vest in them the title to the premises as against 
R. G. Bradbury, the only legal heir." (R. 31-32). 
The Court further stated: 
"The Defendants in this cause had a close and 
confidential relationship with Plaintiffs, prior 
to the rupture,-they visited rather frequently. 
Y'Ora Rasmussen surely knew that R. G. Brad-
bury, son of the Plaintiffs, had told her that if 
she were left anything by Plaintiffs, he would 
fight to defeat it. Moved by this feeling and this 
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fear the inference follows that the deed, the 
lease and transfer of water stock was sought by 
Defendants to circumvent R. G.'s promise so 
made. The Defendants and R. G. Bradbury are 
well known as the principal actors in this con-
troversy, while the Plaintiffs were non-combat-
ants. This court is not concerned in this cause 
with the inside feud." (R. 33}. 
The Court then quotes some of the rules of law 
cited above. 
The Court clearly recognized the issue to be deter-
mined. It stated: 
"There is no contention of Defendants that 
the Plaintiffs made a gift inter vivos or Causa 
~lortis, and none can be presumed. The single 
issue to be determined is: Did the Plaintiffs in-
tend to convey practically all their property, 
some $50 to $60 th,ousand dollars in value, to 
the Defendants, and did they intend to disinherit 
their own flesh and blood in exchange for a life 
estate, a lease and the sum of $1.00?" (R. 33) 
Smne of the proof "gathered from many sources" 
which left "the Chancellor with a fixed feeling that the 
Defendants were determined that the property must 
and would be placed beyond the reach of R. G. Brad-
bury. the only heir of the Plaintiffs," is as follows: 
1. ~IOTIVE 
1\Irs. Rasmussen testified that she knew she would 
not inherit as a legal heir (R. 317), and had been told 
by the son of the Plaintiffs that if she were left any-
thing he would take it away from her. (R. 259, 327). 
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Mr. Rasmussen testified that he was quite sure that the 
son would challenge the rna tter. ( R. 393) . 
2. PRIOR DISCUSSIONS WERE ON THE 
BASIS OF A SALE AT $300.00 AN ACRE TO 
BE PAID OUT OF ONE-HALF OF THE PRO-
CEEDS OF THE OPERATION. 
The discussions comn1enced in the fall at the time 
of the deer hunt and continued through Thanksgiving, 
Christmas, anniversaries in January, and prior to going 
to Mr. Tex Olson's office around the First of February. 
Mrs. Bradbury testified concerning thee fact that the 
offer had been made by a third person to purchase the 
farm at $400.00 an acre but that they would be willing 
to sell it to the Defendants for $300.00. (R. 75). Mrs. 
Rasmussen admitted that there had been such a conver-
sation. (R. 270}. 
Mr. Rasmussen testified that a sale at $300.00 an 
acre was discussed at the time of the deer hunt ( R. 356), 
and on another occasion in his home in Or em. ( R. 
385-7) . Mrs. Rasmussen, after discussing the various 
conversations, admitted that she had testified in her 
deposition as follows: 
Q. Is it fair to say frmn these conversations that 
you and your husband and father and mother 
had tentatively come to an agreement of a 
value of $300.00 an acre? 
A. Yes, I suppose so. (R. 306). 
The Court attached to its Memorandum Decision 
excerpts of testimony concerning the various discussions 
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involving the negotiations for the sale at $300.00 per 
tu.·n· and the payment of one-half of the proceeds on 
the purchase price. (H. a5-:38). Mrs. Rasmussen further 
admitted that she had previously testified in her depo-
sit ion as follows : 
Q. \Vhat did you and your husband say about 
buying the farm? 
A. \Vell, we told then1 that we would buy it if 
there was some satisfactory way that it could 
be worked out for them and for us both. 
to which was added after the taking of the deposition 
"So it would be ours when they died." (R. 305). She 
further admitted that she had testified in her deposition 
concerning the tern1s of payments as follows: 
Q. In this meeting was there anything said about 
the value per acre again? 
A. I think $300.00 an acre was mentioned. But 
I am not sure. 
Q. \Yas anything said about terms of payment 
at that meeting? 
A. They were to have half of the profit after 
the expenses were paid on the farm. 
Q. So th~t, in essence, the contract was going to 
be paid out of the proceeds from the farm; is 
that right? 
A. 'fhat is right. (R. 307). 
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3. DISCUSSIONS IN ATTORNEY OLSON'S 
OFFICE, DOMINATED BY DEFENDANTS, 
STUDIOUSLY ELIMINATED ANY REFER-
ENCE TO PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR A 
SALE. 
Mr. Rasmussen was the one who called Mr. Olson 
and made the appointment and told him that the Brad-
burys wanted to turn the farm over to the Defendants. 
(R. 390). Mr. Rasemussen further stated that in the 
discussion he told Mr. Olson that the Bradburys had 
offered the Defendants the farm and they needed legal 
advice on how it could be arranged so that the farm 
would be the Defendants' when the Plaintiffs died. 
(R. 359-360). The witness admitted, however, that 
there was no mention made to Mr. Olson concerning 
a sale at $300.00 an acre. ( R. 388) . Mrs. Rasmussen 
likewise testified that the sum of $300.00 was not dis-
cussed with Mr. Olson (R. 309-10). Mr. Olson likewise 
testified that there was no discussion with him about a 
purchase or sale or the price of $300.00 per acre. (R. 
402). 
4. THE POSITION OF THE APPELLANTS 
THAT THEY WERE TO HAVE THE PROP-
ERTY WHEN THE RESPONDENTS DIED, 
HOWEVER, WAS REPEATEDLY EMPHA-
SIZED IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. 
OLSON. 
The Defendants admitted that they 1nade it clear 
and emphasized to Mr. Olson the fact that when the 
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Bradbury's died the property would be theirs. (R. 
au.a,, 318). Concerning this subject ~Ir. Rasmussen 
testified as follows: 
Q. Is it fair to say. then, that the things that were 
discussed in ~lr. Olson's office was because 
you wanted to be protected, is that true? 
A. That is true. 
Q. "\\' e wanted the property when Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradbury died?' ' 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that we would pay 50Cfo from operating 
the farm until that time? 
A. That was on the life estate. 
Q. Right. But during the life estate you would 
operate the farm and give them half the pro-
ceeds? 
A. That is right. 
Q. But you did not n1ention that you were pur-
chasing it or intending to purchase it, or that 
you would pay a value of $300.00 an acre? 
A. No, we didn't. (R. 319). 
)lr. Olson was obviously misled since there was 
no discussion concerning a sale. He testified that Mr. 
Rasmussen explained to him that the Rasmussens would 
come and run the farm and that they wanted to be 
secure in taking over the farm and "know that the 
farm wouldn't go to anyone else after the death of Mr. 
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and .1\'Irs. Bradbury." (R. 235). A will was discussed 
but it was rejected by the Rasmussens since Mr. Olson 
explained that it could be changed. (R. 236). Mr. 
Olson further testified that the Ras1nussens were definite 
and positive as to the arrangement which they wanted 
with reference to their owning the property after the 
death of the Bradburys and that the Bradburys were 
vague and indefinite as to the mechanics as to how the 
matter should be handled. (R. 248). Mr. Olson further 
testified that as to the transaction involving the transfer 
of the water stock he dealt exclusively with Mr. Ras-
mussen. ( R. 249) . 
5. THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT UNDER-
STAND THE NATURE OF THE TRANSAC-
TION, BUT RATHER THOUGHT THEY HAD 
MADE A SALE. 
Both of the Plaintiffs testified that they thought 
they were signing a contract for the sale of the farm 
at $300.00 an acre to be paid from one-half of the pro-
ceeds of the operation of the farm. (R. 85, 213). Both 
further testified that Mr. Olson, in reading the docu-
ments read them so fast that they couldn't understand 
them. (R. 84, 219). Two independent witnesses testi-
fied that after the Rasmussens had commenced operat-
ing the farm they had a conversation with the Plaintiffs 
wherein the statement was made that arrangements 
were being made so that the Defendants could buy the 
farm. (R. 181, 186, 405). 
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6. TilE SCRUPULOUS CONDUCT OF THE 
UE}'ENDANTS .AFTER THE SALE WAS SO 
SUPEit-TECIINICAL THAT IT INDICATES 
GUILTY .APPREHENSIONS. 
When ~lr. Rasmussen first came down to operate 
the farm he specifically went to see Mr. Olson to see 
thut everything was completed. (R. 391, 393). Approxi-
mately one 1nonth after the transaction the Defendants 
on their own initiative gave to Mrs. Bradbury a check 
for $1.00, on which was the notation "Payment in Full." 
At the ti1ne it was given to Mrs. Bradbury, Mr. Ras-
mussen told her that it was part of our deal, "that went 
along with the deal, and that Gordon would be moving 
down on the farm, and that it was called for in the con-
tract, and that we wanted to live up to the contract." 
(R. 282). llowever, Mrs. Rasmussen didn't call to 
her mothe1·'s attention the fact that the notation about 
payment in full had been placed on the check. (R. 325). 
)Irs. Bradbury testified that she didn't know what the 
One Dollar check was payment for and did not notice 
that it had a notation thereon regarding the payment 
in full. ( R. 159) . 
~Irs. Rasmussen further testified that the contract 
had been read by her three or four or several times. 
(R. 329). 
The water stock was likewise transferred approxi-
mately ten months after the initial transaction upon 
the initiative of the Defendants and by use of Assign-
ments rather than requesting the Plaintiffs to endorse 
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the certificates themselves. ( R. 210). The new certifi-
cates did not reserve the life estate in the Plaintiffs. 
(R. 398-9). 
7. MRS. RASMUSSEN'S SUBSEQUENT 
CONDUCT DEMONSTRATES CHARACTER 
CAPABLE OF EXERCISING UNDUE IN-
FLUENCE. 
Mrs. Bradbury testified that after the true nature 
of the transaction became known to the Plaintiffs she 
had a conversation with Mrs. Rasmussen in her kitchen 
as follows: 
A. And I said, "Y'Ora, there must be some mis-
take or some misunderstanding about this." I 
said, "Let's get together and thresh it out and 
see what's the matter," and she just 
wouldn't talk about it, and she said, "you get 
out of here". She ordered me out of the house 
and would not talk to me. (R. 410). 
Mrs. Bradbury further testified to a second con-
versation as follows: 
A. I said, "Y'Ora, why did you do such a thing 
as that?", and she said, "I am not depriving 
my children of \heir needs for R. G.'s chil-
dren,and I had to secure myself,'' she said. 
(R. 412). 
The testimony of the Defendants with reference 
to various conversations and transactions in essence 
amounts to calling her parents liars. Mrs. Bradbury 
further testified: 
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Q. ~Irs. Bradbury, was Mr. Bradbury ill and 
more or less confined to his home during the 
last six weeks before he died? 
A. Yes. 
Q. During that period of time did M~s. Rasmus-
sen come into the house and see hun? 
A. Not the six weeks that he was sick. 
Q. Did this have any effect upon him? 
A. ~Ir. Bradbury, with tears in his eyes, said, 
"It does look to me like Y'Ora could come in 
and ask how I was.'' 
Q. During this period of time did you also be-
come confined because of an illness involving 
yourself? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And approximately how long did that last? 
A. It was two weeks that I never walked across 
the house. * * * 
Q. Did Y'Ora help you during that period of 
time1 
A. No. She never even called. ( R. 408} . 
The fact that a confidential relationship existed 
between the parties requires the Defendants to show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction 
was compeltely fair and equitable in all respects. This 
the Appellants have failed to do. Rather, the transaction 
on its face shows the utter unfairness of the same. The 
natural born heir is disinherited and the opportuning 
Defendants stand to be the owners of a farm having a 
value of approximately $60,000.00 upon which they 
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have been living and for which they have paid, accord-
ing to their testimony, $200.00 from the operation of 
the farm. (R. 374}. 
The record rather than showing a rebuttal of the 
presumption of undue influence arising from the con-
fidential relationship, shows to the contrary deliberate 
intentional conduct on the part of the Defendants 
amounting to undue influence and a violation of the 
confidence and trust reposed in them by the Plaintiffs. 
POINT III 
THE MOVING TO THE FARM BY THE 
APPELLANTS MAY HAVE BEEN AN IN-
DUCEMENT FOR THE REDUCTION O:F 
THE SALES PRICE BUT IT WAS NOT THE 
CONSIDERATION F 0 R THE TRANSAC-
TION. 
The Appellants in their argument of Point III 
presuppose that the consideration for the conveying of 
the property and water stock was the moving of the 
Appellants to the farm. Counsel for the Appellants 
then proceed to argue and cite cases to establish that 
such consideration would be adequate to support the 
transfers. The basic assumption is invalid that the Ap· 
pellants moving to the farm was the consideration. The 
Court held to the contrary. 
The Appellant filed a motion to alter and amend 
the Findings of Fact and proposed to the Court that it 
adopt the following Finding of Fact: 
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(t·) 11hat Defendants gave up their home in 
Ore'm, Utah, and moved to Sevier County 
and took over the operation of the farm_, all 
of which was done in consideration of the 
transfer of said property by the Bradburys 
to the Defendants in such manner that said 
Defendants would have the title to said 
property upon the death of the said Brad-
burys. (Italics added). (R. 45). 
The Court agreed to have inserted in the amended 
Findings of Fad the part of the above quotation which 
has been italicized. The balance of the quotation was 
rejected by the Court. 
There is no question but what the Respondents 
naturally desh·ed to have the companionship of the Ap-
pellants and their children. Such desires could only be 
considered under the facts of this case to be the induce-
ment for the transaction at a reduced price and not the 
negotiated and bargained for consideration. As cited 
above, conversations we1·e related wherein the Respond-
ents stated that they had an opportunity to sell the 
farm for $400.00 an acre but would be willing to sell 
it to the Appellants for $300.00 an acre. (R. 75, 270). 
The Appellants cite no evidence to support a con-
tention that moving to the farm was the consideration 
for the conYeyance of the property and the water cer-
tificates. Rather, they merely quote the findings of the 
Court which merely recites the fact that the Respond-
ents desired to have the association with the Appellants 
and that the Appellants did move to Sevier County. It 
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is not logical or reasonable to then draw the inference 
that this conduct was the consideration for the trans-
acton. As demonstrated above, the Court specifically 
and expressly rejected such a contention. The evidence 
reviewed above clearly demonstrates that all of the 
discussions and negotiations were on the basis of a 
sale at $300.00 per acre. The payment of this amount 
was to be the consideration for the transaction. 
As to the Appellants quitting good jobs, etc., the 
testimony is that Mr. Rasmussen was having trouble 
with his feet in working on the concrete and had already 
terminated his business. (R. 75, 212, 321). Mrs. Ras-
mussen testified that she was working in Richfield and 
making about the same as she did in Provo. (R. 330). 
Again the cases cited by the Appellants are inap· 
plicable. The issue is not whether promises to move to 
the farm and take care of the elderly people is suffi-
cient or adequate consideration to support a contract 
but rather there must first be a finding or some evidence 
that such a promise was made as consideration for a 
change of position. The Appellants have cited no evi-
dence to support their contention. The evidence re· 
viewed with reference to other points definitely refutes 
such a contention. Cases may hold that such a change 
of position can be adequate consideration but they must 
be based upon a different factual basis than the one 
presented in this case. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANTS \\'ERE NOT ENTITLED 
'l'O A JURY TRIAL. 
It has been traditional in the State of Utah that 
the conunon law distinction between equity and law 
cases was retained with reference to the right to trial 
by jut·y. If the case is one in equity there is no right 
to a jury trial as a matter of right. The question as to 
whether an action is legal or equitable is discussed in 
some length in Petty vs. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P 2d 
568, 2nd Appeal, 113, Utah, 205, 192 P 2d 589. 
Rule 39 (a) U.R.C.P. cited by the Appellants does 
not involve the basic right of jury trial but rather dis-
cusses the mechanics of designating upon the register 
of action those cases where a trial by jury has been 
demanded presuming that it was a proper case for a 
jury trial in the first instance. The Appellants then 
cite Section 78-21-1 U.C.A. 1953 as being applicable, 
apparently contending that this is an action for the 
recovery of specific real or personal property. To the 
contrary, this is clearly a case to cancel, rescind and 
annul a deed, a lease and a transfer of water certificates. 
This is the very relief granted by the Court. The Ap-
pellants as a first paradox rely on the fact that this 
was an equity case in citing to the Court on page 16 
of their Brief authority to the effect that on an appeal 
in an equity case the review may be both as to law and 
fact. The second paradox is that the former attorney 
for the Respondents requested a jury trial and the 
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counsel for Appellants objected to the same, maintain-
ing that the Respondents were not entitled to a trial on 
the issues by the jury under the provisions of Sec. 78-
21-1 U.C.A. 1953. At the Pre-Trial present counsel 
for Respondents admitted the case was an equity case 
and that the objection was well taken. At that time 
Counsel for the Appellants then reversed his position 
and indicated that he desired a jury trial. In the Appel-
pellant's Brief mention is made of the Pre-Trial pro-
ceedings although no record was made of the same. Also, 
the original of Appellant's objection to the demand for 
jury trial is not in the record and therefore has not 
been certified to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, on 
the 15th day of March, 1962, under the signature of 
counsel for the Appellants the objection to the demand 
for jury trial was served upon John T. Vernieu and 
recited as follows: 
Defendants hereby object to the demand for 
jury trial filed herein by the plaintiffs upon the 
following grounds and for the following reasons: 
1. Plaintiffs are not entitled to trial of the 
issues by a jury under the provisions of Sec. 
78-21-1 U.C.A. 1953. 
2. Timely demand for a jury trial was not 
made, as required by the provisions of Rule 38 
(b) U.R.C.P. 
The separate opinion in the case of Johnson vs. 
Johnson, 9 Utah 2d, 40, 337 P 2d 420, cited by the 
Appellants, would seem to indicate that an action to 
rescind conveyances of real property permits a jury 
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trial under Sec. 78-21-1 U.C.A. However, the main 
opinion under the case holds to the contrary. The case 
is very analogous to the present case. It involved an 
action to cancel and rescind conveyances of real estate 
procured hy a son from a father where a confidential 
rdationship existed. The Court in the Johnson case~ 
stated: 
"In assaying the sufficiency of the proof, the 
Plaintiff here has significant help in the rule 
that where a confidential relationship is shown to 
exist and a gift or conveyance is made to a party 
in a superior position, a presumption arises that 
the transaction is unfair. 1 The presumption has 
the form of eYidence and will itself support a 
finding if not overcome by countervailing evi-
dence. Therefore the burden was on the defend-
ant, Calvin Johnson, to convince the Court by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the trans-
action was fair. 2 If he failed to do so, the finding 
to the contrary was justified,and it will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the contrary evidence 
was so clear and persuasive that all reasonable 
minds would so find." (337 P. 2d 420, 442.) 
The Court further stated: 
"The trial Court properly regarded the pro-
ceedings as in essence an action in equity to de-
clare Yoid instruments by which Calvin Johnson 
proported to obtain his father's property. * * * 
Due to the nature of the action it was within 
the prerogative of the Court to refuse a request 
for a jury!" (337 P.2d, 420, 424). 
1 Omega Investment Company vs. Wooley, 72 Utah 424 271 p 
797, quoting 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 596.' 
a In re Swan's Estate. 4 Utah 2d, 277, 293 P 2d, 682. 
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Prior to the Pre-Trial the Appellants contended 
that this was an equity case. In their Brief on appeal 
before this Court they are still maintaining that this 
is an equity case. The Johnson case cited by the Appel-
lants holds that a suit to rescind and cancel written 
documents is an equity case and that the trial court 
properly deny a jury trial in such a case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants prior to the trial and at the time 
of the trial did not contest but in fact stipulated at one 
point that a confidential relationship existed. There was 
no evidence introduced to refute or rebut such a deter· 
mination of the Trial Court. A confidential relationship 
having been established, the Court properly concluded 
that the Appellants had exerted undue influence. This 
finding may be supported either upon a failure of the 
Appellants to rebut the presumption, or by actual 
specific evidence to the effect that the Appellants speci· 
fically took advantage of the confidence and trust re· 
posed in them. 
The other findings of the Court in addition to the 
determination of undue influence equally support the 
judgment declaring the transfers to be null and void. 
More particularly, they establish that there was no in· 
tent to make a gift; that the transaction was misrepre· 
sen ted; and that there was a mistake of fact on the 
part of the Respondents, knowledge of which was in 
the possession of the Appellants. 
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The A ppellan ls erroneously suggest that the con-
sideration for the transaction was their moving to Sevier 
County, which is contrary to the specific action of the 
Court rejecting such contention. 
Finally, the Appellants should not be permitted 
to inconsistently object to a demand for jury trial prior 
to the trial of the matter urging that the case is an 
equity case and to also urge that the case be reviewed 
ns an equity case and then in a complete reversal main-
tain to this Court that they were erroneously denied the 
right to a jury trial. 
The Trial C nurt studiously reviewed this case after 
the trial and has written a Memorandum Decision sup-
ported by excerpts of testimony. That Memorandum 
Decision dearly shows that there was no doubt in the 
Trial Court's mind concerning its decision on the issues 
in this case. Either under an equity review or the review 
of legal issues there is more than sufficient substantial 
evidence to sustain the Trial Court's determination. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dan S. Bushnell 
Bushnell & Beesley 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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